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INTRODUCTION 
The city and its department of correction now stand at a historic 
crossroads.  New York City’s jail system, largely symbolized by the 
persistently violent and inhumane conditions in the massive jail 
complex on Rikers Island, is an ongoing source of public shame.1  But 
after years of crime and incarceration reduction,2 closing the jail 
facilities on Rikers Island and reimagining the New York City 
Department of Correction (“DOC”) now has become a realistic 
possibility. 
Constant litigation and a number of accounts of violence and 
mistreatment of those held in the DOC’s custody prompted a loud 
and sustained cry for reform.  Perhaps no story galvanized this public 
call more than the story of Kalief Browder, first published in The 
New Yorker in October of 2014.3  Browder was sixteen years old 
when he was arrested and charged with robbery, grand larceny, and 
assault.4  He was held on $3000 bail and spent three years on Rikers 
Island waiting for his trial, unwilling to plead guilty to crimes he did 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Anna Mae Duane, The Shame of Rikers: The Odious 19th-Century 
History of Rikers Island Provides Just One More Good Reason to Shut It Down, 
SLATE (July 13, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/
2017/07/rikers_island_is_the_northern_equivalent_of_confederate_monuments_but_
worse.html [http://perma.cc/3PPP-E82R]. 
 2. Michelle Mark, New York City Is Proof That Cities Don’t Need to Lock Up 
Tons of People to Drive Down Crime, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 5, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nyc-managed-to-lower-incarceration-and-crime-
rates-at-the-same-time-2016-11 [http://perma.cc/G9XX-7ML9]. 
 3. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [http://perma.cc/
7NCL-DJVN]. 
 4. Id. 
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not commit.5  During that time, he experienced brutality at the hands 
of other inmates and staff, and spent months in solitary confinement, 
attempting suicide several times.6  Browder’s case, though eventually 
dismissed, shined a spotlight on the failures of New York City’s 
criminal justice system, and Browder’s suicide in June of 2015 
furthered public outrage about both the conditions on Rikers and the 
excessive delays in the city’s court system.7 
The ever-present claims of abuse and poor conditions of 
confinement on Rikers Island prompted former City Council Speaker 
Melissa Mark-Viverito to set up the Independent Commission on 
New York City Criminal Justice and Incarceration Reform 
(“Commission”), which was to be led by former Chief Judge of the 
New York Court of Appeals, Jonathan Lippman.8  The Commission 
began its work in April of 2016 and began exploring whether or not 
closing Rikers Island was possible, what new jail facilities should look 
like and where they should be located, how the city would pay for it, 
and if closing the jail was possible, what would become of it.9 
In April of 2017, the Commission outlined an ambitious and 
comprehensive blueprint for reforming the city’s criminal justice 
system.10  The plan calls for shuttering the jails on Rikers Island and 
demolishing the other jails currently operated by the DOC off the 
island in order to develop a new smaller, safer, and effective 
incarceration system for New York City.11  At the center of this plan 
are the Commission’s recommendations for dramatically reducing the 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder Learned How to Commit Suicide 
on Rikers, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/kalief-browder-learned-how-to-commit-suicide-on-rikers [https://perma.cc/
P9SG-MKYS]. 
 7. See id.; Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers 
Island for 3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-
for-3-years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html [https://nyti.ms/2jHSU4B]. 
 8. Melissa Mark-Viverito, Speaker, N.Y.C. Council, State of the City Address at 
the Samuel Gompers Campus, South Bronx, N.Y. (Feb. 11, 2016), 
http://mtprauhwprtlcouncil.nyc.gov/html/pr/021116mj.shtml [http://perma.cc/VK9B-
NPJE]. 
 9. See Indep. Comm’n on N.Y.C. Criminal Justice & Incarceration Reform, 
About Us, A MORE JUST N.Y.C., http://www.morejustnyc.com/about-us/#about-
us/rethinking-rikers-island [http://perma.cc/R733-ZEUV]. 
 10. See generally INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE & 
INCARCERATION REFORM, A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY (2017) [hereinafter A 
MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY], https://static1.squarespace.com/static/577d72ee2e69
cfa9dd2b7a5e/t/595d48d1e6f2e1e5bcaa411a/1499285717652/Lippman+Commission+
Report+FINAL+Singles.pdf [http://perma.cc/85JG-4ASN]. 
 11. Id. at 14. 
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daily jail population by almost half, from its current population of 
approximately 9500 to 5000, and developing new a state-of-the-art 
borough-based system with detention facilities in each of the five 
boroughs.12  According to the Commission’s plan, Rikers Island 
would no longer have jail facilities but would be redeveloped to 
expand LaGuardia Airport and replace obsolete, borough-based 
public infrastructure with next-generation infrastructure on the island 
(i.e. wastewater treatment plants and power storage, composting, and 
waste-to-energy facilities).13 
Under the Commission’s plan, new jails would be located near 
courthouses and public transportation, thereby easing the operational 
burden on the DOC and increasing access to the jails by attorneys, 
service providers, and visitors.14  Existing jails in Manhattan, 
Brooklyn, and Queens would be replaced with new buildings, and 
entirely new facilities would be constructed on Staten Island and in 
the Bronx on city-owned land.15  This new built environment would 
be based on, and incorporate, more humane design principles such as 
direct supervision.16  Direct supervision is both a facility design and 
management approach based on the prevention of violence through 
relationship building and communication skills, freedom of 
movement for the incarcerated population, and a normalized 
environment for everyone—from detainees to DOC staff to visitors—
spending time inside jails.17  The Commission also called for the 
development of a new, dedicated DOC training academy as well as a 
longer, more robust training process for line officers and managers.18  
This presents an opportunity to completely reimagine the role of the 
DOC and its staff to align with a vision for a more legitimate criminal 
justice system.19 
After publicly announcing his support for closing Rikers in late 
March, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio released his own 
roadmap for closing Rikers Island in June of 2017 and formed a task 
force to implement the roadmap’s recommendations.20  The roadmap 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 13–19. 
 13. Id. at 107–12. 
 14. Id. at 17–18, 71. 
 15. Id. at 71. 
 16. Id. at 78–82. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 85–86. 
 19. See generally id. at 17–19. 
 20. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF N.Y., SMALLER, SAFER, FAIRER: A 
ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND 5 (2017) [hereinafter SMALLER, SAFER, 
378 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
primarily focuses on the criminal justice reforms necessary to reduce 
the population to a point at which Rikers Island could, feasibly, be 
closed.21  Many of these recommendations track those of the 
Commission.22  The mayor’s roadmap also outlined the importance of 
a built environment and culture change, though it was silent on where 
the new jails would be located.23  When the mayor released this 
report, he also announced the formation of a task force to implement 
the policy changes outlined in the mayor’s roadmap.24  Importantly, 
there will be a dedicated committee developing and implementing 
recommendations for culture change.25 
However, reducing the population and developing new, state-of-
the-art facilities in the city’s five boroughs—closer to families, 
attorneys, and resources such as employment and mental health 
services providers—are reforms that will not, on their own, solve the 
deeper problems that have long troubled the DOC.  Although much 
of the current criticism of the DOC focuses on a rampant “culture of 
violence” that has persisted on Rikers Island, the jail complex’s 
problems are symptoms of the violent, overly punitive, and neglected 
correctional system that operates throughout the DOC jails.26  All 
DOC jails—not just those on Rikers Island, but also the existing 
facilities operated in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan—have 
high levels of violence, are in various states of decay, are outmoded, 
and are marred by inhospitable conditions for those held and staff 
alike.27 
Simply closing Rikers Island and the existing borough facilities and 
moving to a borough-based jail system will not bring long-term 
reform.28  In tandem with the criminal justice reforms outlined by the 
Commission and in the mayor’s plan, the city must take difficult and 
                                                                                                                 
FAIRER], https://rikers.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/Smaller-Safer-Fairer-1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PW9P-REYG]. 
 21. Id. at 8–9. 
 22. Id. at 4–5. 
 23. Id. at 39. 
 24. Id. at 48. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The Mayor’s Management Report (“MMR”) is a mandated report released 
twice a year to provide a public account of the performance of city agencies.  For the 
DOC, data aggregates violence metrics across the entire system and does not 
separate by facility or island versus non-island facilities. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF 
OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 84–89 (2017) [hereinafter MMR 
2017], http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2017/2017_mmr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W897-7UY5]. 
 27. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 71. 
 28. See infra Section I.A. 
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concrete steps to address the organizational culture that exists at the 
DOC, regardless of geography.29  This includes addressing the core 
issues of violence, mismanagement, and inefficiency that have long 
plagued the DOC itself.30  Reform through piecemeal litigation or 
policy change—strategies that have driven past reform efforts at the 
DOC, while achieving some important results, have never successfully 
addressed many of the DOC’s underlying, deep-rooted problems.31 
Organizational culture consists of the beliefs, assumptions, and 
values that guide an organization’s operations and affect how its 
members think and act.32  Culture involves the unspoken ways that an 
organization solves its problems, and the assumptions and habits that 
members, including new members, share and adopt.33  Culture is 
fundamental to an organization’s operations, although it is often 
mistakenly overlooked or else not prioritized in efforts to change an 
organization.  This Article will explore this concept of culture change 
through the lens of historical reform efforts, in order to firmly 
establish the importance of addressing culture and corresponding 
operational challenges as the city contemplates closing the Rikers 
Island jail facilities. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of 
the history of violence of New York City jails, past efforts for reform, 
and current recommendations for reform.  Part II presents the idea of 
comprehensive reform through cultural change, both outlining its 
tenants and detailing how it can be applied within the DOC to 
achieve lasting positive changes. 
I.  HISTORICAL CONDITIONS AT NEW YORK CITY JAILS 
Part I will outline the conditions in the jails throughout the DOC, 
the history of litigation, historical reform efforts, and current reform 
plans as outlined by both the Commission and the mayor.  Section I.A 
describes the conditions in the DOC jails on Rikers Island and 
throughout the boroughs, including the legacy of violence and neglect 
and efforts at reform from the 1970s to 2014.  Section I.B details the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See infra Section I.A. 
 30. See infra Section I.A. 
 31. See infra Section I.A. 
 32. CAROL FLAHERTY-ZONAS ASSOCS., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., BUILDING 
CULTURE STRATEGICALLY: A TEAM APPROACH FOR CORRECTIONS 15 (Flaherty-
Zonas ed., 2007). 
 33. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 7–21(4th 
ed. 2010). 
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Nunez v. City of New York 34 litigation, describing the complaint and 
the federal consent decree under which the DOC is currently 
operating.  Section I.C outlines the current agenda for reform as 
embodied in the Commission’s recommendations and the 
recommendations outlined in the mayor’s roadmap to close Rikers 
Island. 
A. Conditions at DOC: Historic and Continuing Challenges 
One ever-present challenge of Rikers Island is its geographic 
isolation.  Rikers Island functions as New York City’s penal colony, 
with ten facilities located on a remote 413-acre piece of land perched 
in the East River between the Bronx and Queens.35  The majority of 
the population—over seventy-five percent—are being held there pre-
trial, meaning that they have not yet been convicted of a crime.36  The 
island’s remote location contributes to delays in court processing time 
for felony and misdemeanor cases, inhibits access to attorneys and 
programming, and discourages visits by family.37  It also results in an 
“out of sight, out of mind” approach to the city’s jail system that is 
unsafe and unproductive for those who are held and those who work 
there.38 
But remoteness and isolation are only part of the deep-rooted 
problems troubling Rikers Island.  The facilities on Rikers, which first 
opened as a jail complex in the early 1930s, are in deep decay.39  
Facilities throughout the system have rotting floorboards, 
malfunctioning heating and cooling systems, sewage backups, leaking 
roofs, broken showers, and flooded bathrooms.40  This decay has led 
to harmful conditions for those incarcerated,41 and has created an 
inhospitable environment.42  This inhospitable environment is further 
worsened due to the lack of basic services, such as heating in winter 
                                                                                                                 
 34. 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 35. A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 103. 
 36. Id. at 33. 
 37. Id. at 73–75. 
 38. Id. at 14. 
 39. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., History of DOC, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/
history-doc.page [http://perma.cc/VB2B-RL73]. 
 40. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 72. 
 41. For example, the broken materials provide opportunities for people to make 
weapons. See id. at 72. 
 42. See Raven Rakia, A Sinking Jail: The Environmental Disaster That Is Rikers 
Island, GRIST (Mar. 15, 2016), http://grist.org/justice/a-sinking-jail-the-environmental-
disaster-that-is-rikers-island/ [http://perma.cc/MYW3-QYFC]. 
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and air conditioning in summer.43  In addition to decaying and 
dangerous facilities and the lack of basic services, incarcerated 
persons are typically housed in multi-occupancy cells with no privacy, 
and the jails have little space for social services that are best practice 
in a modern correctional system.44 
Even worse, the people held on the island endure physical and 
mental abuse, a rampant culture of violence, and overly punitive 
conditions.45  This has included alarming rates of force used against 
adolescents, rampant inmate-on-inmate assaults, and correction 
officers using blows to the head and force as punishment or 
retribution in response to verbal altercations with officers.46  In 
addition, there is a link between jail conditions and the violence that 
occurs within the facilities both by staff and by those held in the 
facilities.47  For example, the deteriorating physical conditions 
throughout the system provide an opportunity to fashion weapons 
from light fixtures, radiators, and sprinkler heads; in fact, most of the 
weapons found inside the jails in 2014 were improvised from 
materials already inside the jails.48  For both staff and those held, 
these punishing conditions, in addition to the rampant violence, have 
persisted for decades; those held on Rikers Island have described the 
island using terms such as “hellhole,” “torture island,” and “the land 
that time forgot.”49 
These problems are not confined to Rikers, nor do they only 
impact those who are incarcerated.  These problems also lead to an 
inhospitable environment for correction officers (“COs”) and other 
DOC staff.  City data demonstrates that, like the facilities on Rikers 
Island, borough-based facilities also are marred by pervasive violence 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See id.; Brad Hamilton, Cell Damage: Rikers in Ruins After Years of Neglect, 
N.Y. POST (Jan. 13, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/01/13/cell-damage-rikers-in-ruins-
after-years-of-neglect/ [http://perma.cc/2654-66KG]. 
 44. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 13, 77. 
 45. See U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIPA 
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS JAILS ON 
RIKERS ISLAND 3 (2014) [hereinafter SDNY RIKERS REPORT], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20
Rikers%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QPB-2VDK]. 
 46. Id. at 4. 
 47. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 72. 
 48. See id. at 72. 
 49. See id. at 27; see also Jonathan Lippman & Melissa Mark-Viverito, Opinion, 
Closing Rikers Island Is a Moral Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/opinion/closing-rikers-island-is-a-moral-
imperative.html [https://nyti.ms/2nFxqVW]. 
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and by decaying and outmoded conditions.50  While the average daily 
population has steadily declined, rates of violence in the DOC have 
persisted.  There are a number of explanations for violence in the 
facilities, between COs and those held and between inmates, 
including inability to appropriately manage the population due to 
inadequate training and management of staff and deteriorating 
facilities across the DOC.51  As on Rikers Island, the borough-based 
jails are generally inhospitable, with deteriorating buildings, broken 
heating and cooling systems, harsh lighting, and reverberating 
surfaces.52  And with the exception of the Manhattan Detention 
Center, all the DOC facilities are based on now obsolete design 
principles with a linear layout that makes curbing violence difficult.53 
Figure 1, below, shows the historical violence trends in the DOC 
over the last two decades. The trends are based on what the system 
calls “stabbings and slashings.”  This is inmate-on-inmate violence 
with the use of a weapon (usually some type of razor or homemade 
knife).54  If stabbing and slashing rates are high, it is also quite likely 
that all use of force, unjustified use of force, and attacks on COs will 
also be high.55  The opposite is also true, if stabbing and slashing rates 
are low, use of force will be low.56 
 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer 2015 Analysis: 
Violence at City Jails Spikes Dramatically and Cost per Inmate Explodes Even as 




 51. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 73. 
 52. Id.; see also, e.g., Daniel Beekman, Bronx’s Notorious Spofford Shut Down, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
bronx-notorious-spofford-aka-bridges-juvenile-center-finally-shut-article-1.119333 
[https://perma.cc/6WQD-47Z6].  
 53. Linear jails typically contain cells lined up along corridors, so that correction 
officers cannot easily monitor groups consistently. Richard Wener et al., Direct 
Supervision of Correctional Institutions, in PODULAR, DIRECT SUPERVISION JAILS 
INFORMATION PACKET 1–8 (Nat’l Inst. of Corr. ed., 1993). 
 54. N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY JAILS: STABBING AND 




 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. 
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Figure 1. Historical Violence Trends at the DOC, as Measured by 
Stabbing and Slashing Incidents.57 
 
As shown, while the average daily population has steadily 
decreased since fiscal year 1995, violence rates, which peaked at over 
59 stabbings and slashings per 1000 inmates in 1995, declined to a low 
of under 2 per 1000 inmates from 2003 to 2009.58  After an initial 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See MMR 2017, supra note 26, at 72–74; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, 
MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 81 (2016) [hereinafter MMR 2016], 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2016/2016_mmr.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/57LL-MUPB]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S 
MANAGEMENT REPORT 82–83 (2015) [hereinafter MMR 2015], http://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2015/2015_mmr.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG3M-
SRCK]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 143–44 
(2008) [hereinafter MMR 2008], http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/
pdf/mmr/0908_mmr.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9XC-SR66]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF 
OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT: SUPPLEMENTARY INDICATOR 
TABLES 76 (2004), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr/0904_
indicators.pdf [https://perma.cc/D82M-9WUB]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, 
MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT: SUPPLEMENTARY INDICATOR TABLES 71 (2002), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr/0902_indicators.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4HW-YF3X]; VIOLENCE IN N.Y.C. JAILS 2009–2014, supra note 54, 
at 2; Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, Average Daily Jail Population in New York 
City, 1980–2017, CITY OF N.Y. (Jan. 1, 2018), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
criminaljustice/downloads/pdfs/population_reduction_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8L47-C4A7]; NYC Department of Correction at a Glance, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR. 
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/pdf/DOC_At-Glance-4-
27-17.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y87N-QKAT]. 
 58. See MMR 2008, supra note 57, at 143–44; VIOLENCE IN N.Y.C. JAILS 2009–
2014, supra note 54, at 2. 
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dramatic decrease in violence rates, and a leveling off, the DOC has 
seen a steady increase in violence since fiscal year 2009.59  Since 2009 
violence rates have steadily increased to over 17 per 1000 inmates in 
2017, a thirteen fold increase from 2008.60  While still not close to 
1995 levels, the trend is deeply concerning.61  These conditions, 
coupled with the changing needs, particularly those related to 
behavioral health, of people cycling through the system, have 
developed a reputation for the DOC as a hopeless institution for staff 
and inmates alike.62 
1. A Legacy of Violence, Neglect, and Litigation 
The troubling and inhumane conditions in New York City jails are 
not new.  Before the bridge to Rikers Island was constructed in 1966, 
the majority of pre-trial detainees were housed in borough jails.63  
The Manhattan House of Detention (“the Tombs”), once was as 
notorious as Rikers Island due to its severe overcrowding and poor 
conditions for both inmates and officers.64  In the late 1960s, the 
Correction Officers Benevolent Association (“COBA”), New York 
City’s union for correction officers, urged the DOC to address the 
jail’s deteriorating conditions, severe understaffing, and a lack of new 
officer training.65  The DOC made attempts to expedite case 
processing times to address overcrowding at the Tombs, but did little 
else to address rising tensions within the facility.66  In 1970, tensions 
came to a head as an inmate uprising at the Tombs brought public 
attention to the overcrowding, officer brutality and racism, overly 
punitive conditions of confinement, and deteriorating environmental 
conditions.67  Those held were “locked-in” to their cells twenty-four 
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hours per day, meaning they were unable to leave their cells at any 
time for exercise or family visits, and some were not taken to court 
appearances.68  They were denied showers and shaves, as well as 
access to religious counseling.69  Sick calls were also unavailable.70  
Finally, people were served sandwiches rather than normal dinner 
menus and were forced to eat in their cells.71 
Mounting tensions, overcrowding, and poor conditions led to a 
series of lawsuits in the second half of the twentieth century and the 
early part of the twenty-first century challenging the conditions of 
confinement and treatment of those held at jails both on and off 
Rikers Island.  In 1970, the Legal Aid Society filed a federal class-
action lawsuit, Rhem v. McGrath,72 against the DOC for conditions at 
the Tombs in Manhattan.73  The suit—the first in a series of federal 
class action lawsuits brought by the Legal Aid Society (“Legal Aid”) 
against the DOC over four decades—resulted in a 1973 consent 
decree, which addressed the issues related to overcrowding, 
unsanitary conditions, and medical care.74 
In 1974, after the city failed to submit adequate plans for 
compliance with the consent decree, presiding Judge Morris E. 
Lasker of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York ordered the Tombs to be shut down.75  Judge Lasker 
understood that the changes under the consent decree would require 
significant planning and funding, and found that it was apparent that 
the city would not develop a plan for a reform.76  The city appealed 
Judge Lasker’s decision citing a lack of adequate resources.77  The 
Second Circuit upheld Judge Lasker’s decision holding “that 
inadequate resources did not justify the state’s deprivation of 
constitutional rights.”78  Furthermore, the 400 men still incarcerated 
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at the Tombs were transferred to the House of Detention for Men 
(“HDM”) on Rikers Island, where conditions—like overcrowding, 
deteriorating physical conditions, and disciplinary procedures—were 
just as poor as at the Tombs.79 
As the city budget crisis of the early 1970s worsened, action to 
address conditions of confinement was delayed, and in 1975, the most 
destructive inmate uprising yet erupted on Rikers Island.80  
Corrections Commissioner Benjamin J. Malcolm was able to 
negotiate an end to the protests, which arose out of complaints from 
inmates due to overcrowding and conditions in the facilities, and 
avoid bloodshed by agreeing to address the grievances of those 
incarcerated.81  After the uprising, the DOC was forced to move 
people to other DOC facilities while repairs were made to large holes 
in cells and other debris was cleaned up.82  But COs on Rikers Island 
staged a walkout to protest the fact that the DOC had not issued a 
plan to address the unsafe working conditions in the facilities.83 
Following that uprising, Legal Aid filed a new federal class action 
lawsuit, Benjamin v. Malcom,84 alleging that conditions at the HDM 
were also unconstitutional.85  The Koch administration negotiated a 
settlement agreement that would cover all of the city jails on and off 
Rikers Island.86  In 1978, a consent decree was agreed to by all parties 
and in 1979, Judge Lasker approved and entered the consent 
judgment.87  Two critical issues covered by the consent decree were 
overcrowding and developing policies for the treatment of those held 
at HDM.88 
In 1983, Legal Aid brought Fisher v. Koehler,89 alleging that the 
DOC used excessive force on individuals incarcerated in the 
Correctional Institution for Men (“CIFM”), now the Eric M. Taylor 
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Center, on Rikers Island.90  Judge Lasker also heard this case and 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that use of force was excessive 
and “that the pervasiveness of staff-on-inmate violence was the 
predictable result of defendant’s policies and practices . . . .”91  In 
1985, Legal Aid brought a similar case, Jackson v. Montemagno,92 
against the DOC claiming abuse of the incarcerated population by 
staff at the Brooklyn House of Detention.93  The case was settled in 
1991, referencing the agreement reached in Fisher, requiring the 
DOC to develop and implement systems for controlling and 
investigating use of force incidents and disciplining COs for 
unnecessary or excessive force.94 
In 2003, the DOC and the Urban Justice Center also settled a class 
action suit, Brad H. v. City of New York,95 which had been brought in 
state court claiming that the city failed to provide adequate discharge 
planning as part of their care for those with a diagnosed mental 
illness.96  While this case covered the DOC as a whole, it again 
targeted a specific population, i.e., those with a diagnosed mental 
illness.97  A settlement agreement was reached that required the 
DOC to develop a discharge plan based on an assessment for those 
individuals’ needs for continued treatment and support services, 
public benefits, and appropriate housing.98  The DOC was also 
required to provide assistance and access to the services set forth in 
the plan.99  A monitoring team was established that continues to 
monitor progress towards the agreement, and the thirty-seventh 
monitor’s report was filed in June of 2017.100 
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In 2012, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York (“USAO”) began an investigation into the 
treatment of adolescent males between the ages of sixteen and 
eighteen held on Rikers Island.101  The investigation, pursuant to the 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,102 focused on excessive 
and unnecessary use of force by the DOC COs and supervisors, 
whether the DOC adequately protects adolescent males from 
violence by other inmates, and whether the DOC’s reliance on 
punitive segregation subjects young people to excessive risk of 
harm.103  At the conclusion of the investigation, the USAO sent a 
letter to Mayor de Blasio, DOC Commissioner Ponte, and 
Corporation Counsel Zachery Carter, outlining the findings of their 
report.104  The USAO concluded that there was a pattern and practice 
of conduct that violated the constitutional rights of adolescents held 
on Rikers Island.105  The adolescents were not adequately protected 
from serious physical harm from the “rampant use of unnecessary and 
excessive force by DOC” and were also not protected from harm 
caused by violence from other inmates.106  Furthermore, the USAO 
found that the DOC relied too heavily on punitive segregation, 
placing adolescents in solitary confinement “at an alarming rate and 
for excessive periods of time.”107  Generally, the investigation 
revealed that a deep-seated culture of violence was pervasive 
throughout the adolescent facilities on Rikers Island.108 
2. Efforts at Reform: 1970s to 2014 
Between the 1970s and 2014, the federal court made efforts to 
reform the DOC through its judicial opinions and through the 
implementation of judicial oversight.  For example, in the early 1980s 
the federal court monitored implementation of policy and practice 
changes under the terms of the settlement agreements in Benjamin 
and Fisher, discussed above.  However, those cases only covered 
policy and practice in specific facilities rather than across the DOC as 
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a whole.109  Then in 1990, Judge Lasker held that the city violated an 
order prohibiting the housing of incarcerated individuals in non-
housing areas, including gymnasiums and receiving areas, and found 
that the violence at CIFM was caused by overcrowding, inadequate 
staffing and supervision, excessive reliance on dormitory housing, 
lack of adequate classification, and inadequate systems for 
controlling, investigating, and disciplining staff misuse of force.110  In 
1989, Judge Lasker approved a new use-of-force policy to address the 
violence at CIFM, under Fisher, and in 1990, during the population 
surge at the DOC, imposed a series of fines holding that the DOC 
had violated his order prohibiting the housing of individuals in non-
housing areas.111  In the early 1990s, the DOC began addressing other 
condition-of-confinement issues including the provision of food 
services, access to the law library, environmental health (sanitary 
conditions, ventilation, lighting, and extreme temperatures), attorney 
visitation and confidentiality, placement of pre-trial detainees in 
restraints, fire safety, and modular housing units.112 
In 1982, under the Malcolm case, Judge Lasker ordered the 
creation of the Office of Compliance Consultants (“OCC”), to 
oversee implementation of the consent decree requirements.113  The 
OCC was designed to be an agency of the city, not the court or the 
DOC, with leadership appointed by the city and staff from the 
DOC.114  This agency was designed to allow for greater cooperation 
among the city, Legal Aid, and the DOC.115  Because it was 
considered a relatively neutral party, the OCC was successful in 
inducing the DOC to adopt reform strategies, though these reforms 
only chipped away at the DOC’s entrenched culture.116 
In addition to court oversight, the New York City Board of 
Correction (“the Board”) provides more general oversight of the 
DOC, separate from court oversight.  Originally established in 1957 
by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, and expanded in 1977 under Mayor 
Beane, the Board is a citizen watchdog agency to set and enforce 
minimum standards for the DOC. 117  The minimum standards seek to 
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ensure the care, custody, correction, treatment, supervision, and 
discipline of those held in the DOC.118  The Board fulfills this mission 
through the evaluation of the DOC’s performance and operation of a 
system for hearing grievances and issues from the DOC, both from 
those incarcerated in the DOC facilities and from the general 
public.119  Made up of nine members appointed by the mayor and the 
city council, the Board has the right to access any DOC data or 
records and the right to inspect and visit any DOC facility at any 
time.120  The Board continues to incorporate best practices into its 
minimum standards, including those related to the use of force and 
punitive segregation, as well as the provision of basic necessities to 
ensure proper conditions of confinement.121  The Board sets 
minimum standards, but its success as an oversight agency has been 
limited primarily because it lacks strong mechanisms to actually 
incentivize compliance or to enforce its rights to obtain data and 
documentation from the DOC.122 
These reform efforts function primarily through litigation and 
reflect a largely backward-looking responsive policy approach rather 
than a forward-looking comprehensive approach to reform at the 
DOC.  There are many external factors that contribute to this 
reactive policy approach.  A primary factor is the ever-changing 
nature of leadership in public bureaucracies, which makes stability 
hard to come by.123  The DOC is an agency within city government, 
and its commissioner is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the 
mayor.124  This means that the highest rung of DOC leadership can 
change every four years, or less, depending on the performance of the 
commissioner or on the number of terms the appointing mayor 
serves.125  Many of the staff, however, stay much longer.126  In the 
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absence of consistent leadership from above, default subcultures can 
develop within the staff that set standards for operations.127 
B. Nunez: The Complaint, the Consent, and the Monitor 
Ever worsening conditions and the recent spike in violence, 
coupled with press attention to a number of high-profile incidents, 
prompted Legal Aid to file a new class-action lawsuit in 2011 known 
as Nunez v. City of New York in the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.128  That lawsuit resulted in a consent decree 
that outlined a number of areas for reform to address the pattern and 
practice of permitting violence across the DOC.129  To oversee the 
reform, the consent decree also appointed a monitor who reports 
progress and remaining challenges back to the court on a bi-annual 
basis (“Monitor”).130  The complaint and resulting consent decree will 
be discussed in turn. 
1. The Complaint 
In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that a pattern and practice 
of unnecessary and excessive use of force by uniform staff, including 
COs, captains, and wardens, existed and was knowingly permitted 
and encouraged by the DOC supervisors in the jails and at the highest 
levels of the DOC.131  They further alleged that the DOC supervisors 
created and perpetuated a deeply entrenched pattern and policy of 
permitting uniformed staff to use unlawful, excessive force against 
inmates with impunity.132 
To support these allegations, the complaint cited previous litigation 
that had exposed a culture of routine and institutionalized violence 
against inmates by staff, a failure of accountability at all levels, and 
deliberate and calculated indifference to constitutional violations.133  
The complaint argued that if the relief obtained by the respective 
classes in the previous litigation had been sustained, the 
unconstitutional conditions and culture would have been 
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addressed.134  The complaint cited to specific failed reforms such as 
staff training, video monitoring, thorough investigations into serious 
uses of force by staff, discipline for staff who violate the DOC’s use-
of-force policy, staffing practices to ensure those who violate the use-
of-force policy have little to no contact with those incarcerated, and 
personnel policies that terminate the worst violators while promoting 
conscientious officers.135 
2. The Consent Decree 
In October 2015, a consent decree was reached in Nunez that 
required a drastic overhaul of the DOC in order to fundamentally 
reform the DOC’s culture of violence.136  The consent decree outlined 
provisions around use-of-force training, anonymous and accurate 
reporting and investigation procedures, increased video surveillance, 
and greater accountability for staff.137  The USAO joined the Nunez 
settlement to ensure that the reforms would also apply to the 
adolescents held on Rikers Island.138  This litigation and consent 
decree provide the most comprehensive reform action to date, 
requiring reforms across a number of policy and procedure areas for 
the entire DOC and specific measures for sixteen to eighteen-year-
olds held in city jails. 
First, the Nunez consent decree set robust requirements for 
developing a new use-of-force policy, including requirements for 
reporting use of force and conducting complete and timely 
investigations of use of force and other violent incidents.139  Meeting 
these requirements involves designating a Use-of-Force Auditor to be 
responsible for analyzing all data relating to use of force incidents and 
identifying trends and patterns.140  The DOC is also required to 
develop a new computerized case management system to track data 
relating to all violent incidents (including alleged sexual assault) 
involving COs in a centralized manner.141  A centralized system must 
also be developed to allow correctional staff to anonymously report 
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all incidents of institutionalized violence.142  The DOC must retain an 
outside consultant to conduct an independent review of the DOC’s 
infractions processes and procedures.143 
Second, the consent decree requires the DOC to take all necessary 
steps to impose appropriate and meaningful staff discipline, up to and 
including termination, when COs engage in the excessive or 
unnecessary use of force or otherwise violate the use-of-force 
policy.144  This system must include standardized guidelines to impose 
such appropriate and meaningful discipline, including a range of 
penalties and a system of progressive disciplinary sanctions.145  The 
DOC must also develop a system, subject to the Monitor’s review and 
approval, to identify, as soon as possible, COs whose conduct may 
warrant corrective actions or raise systemic policy or training 
deficiencies.146  Prior to promotions, the DOC must also undertake a 
review of an officer’s prior involvement in use-of-force incidents to 
verify that this does not raise concerns about the officer’s 
qualifications.147 
Third, the DOC must install a comprehensive video surveillance 
program.148  This includes installing stationary wall-mounted 
surveillance cameras to ensure complete camera coverage in all areas 
of all facilities by February 28, 2018.149  The DOC must also pilot 
body-worn cameras in specific areas across the jail facilities, including 
intake, the mental health observation units, punitive segregation 
units, young inmate housing units, and other areas that have high 
violence or staff-on-inmate contact rates.150  Finally, DOC is required 
to designate a supervisor to maintain cameras and monitors and 
preserve all video for at least ninety days generally and for four years 
after an incident.151 
Fourth, the consent decree requires the DOC to develop and 
implement a number of new pre-service and in-service training 
programs, as well as strengthen and improve existing training 
programs addressing a variety of subject matters.  New policy and 
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procedure training modules are required in the following areas: use of 
force; crisis intervention and conflict resolution; probe team response 
to emergency situations and alarms; defensive tactics; cell extraction 
policies and procedures; and procedures, skills, and techniques for 
investigations.152  In addition, new trainings are also required in the 
areas of young inmate management, and direct supervision as well as 
retraining when a staff member violates the use-of-force policy.153 
Fifth, the consent decree requires the DOC to develop a 
comprehensive staff recruitment program to attract well-qualified 
applicants and to employ an objective process to select and hire 
staff.154 
Sixth, the consent decree outlines a number of provisions specific 
to the safety and supervision of those under the age of nineteen held 
at the DOC.155  The consent decree requires officers to supervise 
young people at all times to protect them from an unreasonable risk 
of harm, and requires officers to inspect housing areas daily to ensure 
safe and secure conditions.156  The consent decree also requires the 
development of an age appropriate classification tool specifically for 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.157  A classification tool measures 
the incarcerated person’s risk of violence while in the jail system.158  
Such a tool will separate those at high and low risk of violence in 
addition to separating sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from 
adults.159  The long-standing classification model for the DOC has 
been to assign detainees a score according to age, severity of charge 
and previous convictions, history of escape, past institutional conduct, 
gang affiliation, and number of prior arrests and felonies.160  
According to their score, each inmate is classified as minimum, 
medium, or maximum custody, and housed accordingly, with 
reclassification occurring every sixty days.161 
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It also mandates there be a sufficient level of programming for 
young people consistent with best practices.162  The DOC is required 
to take appropriate action to protect vulnerable young people and 
when the individual, family, or attorney expresses concern, that 
individual should be placed in secure housing.163  Moreover, those 
individuals under the age of eighteen shall no longer be placed in 
punitive segregation or isolation and the DOC should develop 
systems, policies and procedures to incentivize positive behaviors and 
to address disciplinary issues while not compromising the safety of 
staff and other inmates.164  Finally, the Mayor’s Office of Criminal 
Justice is required to make best efforts to identify an alternative 
housing site not on Rikers Island for those under the age of 
eighteen.165 
Seventh, the consent decree outlines the monitoring provisions, 
including requiring the DOC to submit progress reports to the 
Monitor and plaintiff’s counsel.166  The Monitor is also appointed, and 
access to information is established.167  The Monitor is required to 
submit a report, at the end of each reporting period, evaluating the 
DOC’s progress towards compliance.168 
3. The Monitor 
The Monitor is tasked with reviewing the reforms undertaken by 
the DOC within the major operational areas addressed by the consent 
decree, discussed above, and reporting progress to the court twice a 
year.169  Overall, the Monitor has found the DOC to be committed to 
reform and cooperative in efforts to reach it.  However, all of the 
Monitor’s reports to date have expressed concern regarding whether 
the DOC lacks sufficient staffing, management, and space resources 
to sustain the new policies and procedures.170  The resignation of 
DOC Commissioner Joseph Ponte in May 2017 only contributes to 
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the challenges.171  While the Monitor has found that progress has 
been made in some areas, there are remaining challenges facing the 
DOC in their efforts to reach substantial compliance, as discussed 
below. 
a. Accountability: Reporting, Investigations, and Discipline 
A critical area for reform under the consent decree is the use of 
force by staff against those detained.  The DOC, working with the 
Monitor, has developed a new directive, effective October 2017 that 
addresses all reporting requirements.172  The development of this new 
use-of-force directive has been a priority for the Monitor.173  The 
directive outlines both permissive and impermissive use of force by 
staff.174 
The Monitor found that the DOC has made several strides in its 
efforts to curb violence and inappropriate behavior and implement a 
new and more robust use of force directive.  First, the DOC has 
appropriately and thoughtfully advised its staff about the 
implementation of the new directive.175  In addition, the messaging 
campaign for the training program was creative, constructive, and 
conveyed a positive and productive message.176 
Second, the DOC has made efforts to more accurately and reliably 
track incidents of violence and inappropriate use of force through 
more structured internal oversight.177  For example, the DOC has 
made improvements to its methods of data collection and utilization, 
which enables it to better understand and respond to the ways in 
which the staff uses force in the jails.178  In March of 2016, the DOC 
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implemented an anonymous reporting hotline to provide a 
confidential space for reporting use-of-force violations.179  This 
hotline is in addition to already available mechanisms for reporting 
alleged use-of-force policy violations such as calling 311, notifying the 
Department of Investigation, and alerting Legal Aid, among 
others.180  The DOC also hired a Use-of-Force Auditor, who began 
working at the DOC in August 2016 and reports directly to the 
commissioner.181  The Monitor has been impressed with the analysis 
the Use-of-Force Auditor has demonstrated in his quarterly 
reports.182 
Further, in early 2016, the DOC contracted with Jeffrey A. Beard, 
Ph.D., former secretary of the California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation, to conduct an independent review of its use-of-
force infraction process and procedures, which the DOC and 
monitoring team are considering reforming.183  The DOC has also 
been building a case management system (“CMS”) to gather, track 
and report use-of-force data, but it is not yet complete.184  The 
Monitor has found the in-progress CMS to be robust and believes it 
will surpass the requirements outlined by the consent decree.185 
Fourth, the DOC has developed a draft of the New Disciplinary 
Guidelines Policy addressing all of the specific discipline 
requirements under the consent decree.  These guidelines were to 
take effect on October 27, 2017, which is thirty days after the effective 
date of the new use-of-force directive.186  The DOC also recruited and 
hired a Deputy Risk Manager who will be responsible for developing 
and implementing risk mitigation systems to achieve the goals of this 
provision.187 
Finally, the DOC is on track to meet the deadline to install 
additional wall-mounted cameras but has requested an extension for 
the body-worn camera pilot project.188 
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Despite this progress, the Monitor has also identified areas in need 
of improvement.  The Monitor noted that while the DOC has made 
progress in addressing use of force, there remains a deeply 
entrenched culture of managing difficult or dangerous inmates with 
an iron fist.189  To overcome these challenges, the Monitor urges the 
DOC to hire additional staff to support the Use-of-Force Auditor’s 
efforts.190  Additionally, to support the DOC’s progress, the Monitor 
recommends creating high-ranking uniformed liaisons from each unit 
to participate in the Nunez Compliance Unit that was created within 
the DOC to ensure adherence to the consent decree terms.191  The 
Monitor also recommends creating full-time, continuous positions 
within the Nunez Compliance Unit for civilian staff and uniformed 
staff at all ranks.192  Further, the Monitor has expressed concern 
regarding the use of hand-held cameras to capture use-of-force 
incidents, finding that footage often was not captured because staff 
were either not bringing cameras to the scene or not adequately 
filming the incident.193  As such, the Monitor continues to urge the 
DOC to hold staff more accountable when it comes to filming use-of-
force incidents.194 
b. Workforce: Recruiting, Training, and Promotions 
The Monitor has observed several positive developments in terms 
of workforce recruiting, training, and promotions.  First, the Monitor 
has observed significant improvements in the DOC’s efforts to 
strengthen its recruiting and hiring practices in order to reduce 
violence.  For instance, as a part of this process, the Recruitment Unit 
brought on a new human resources director in May of 2016, and 
developed a profile for an “ideal candidate” for the DOC, including 
criteria for leadership and communication styles, physical attributes, 
and experience.195  In 2015, the DOC also created a Recruiter 
Training Manual to specifically outline the ideal candidate profile and 
describe overall recruitment goals, strengths, challenges, threats, and 
opportunities.196  This manual was accompanied by a new training 
program for recruitment staff as well as an updated external presence 
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for the DOC, including a revamped DOC website and marketing 
campaign.197  By prioritizing engagement with potential recruits 
through career fairs and community events, the Recruitment Unit 
substantially increased the number of candidates taking the required 
exam and applying for staff positions.198 
Second, the Monitor noted that the DOC has made strides in 
attracting a much stronger candidate pool,199 a crucial step towards 
creating a more competitive and high-quality DOC workforce.  For 
instance, new leadership at the Applicant Investigation Unit (“AIU”) 
has focused on building up the capacity of the unit to improve the 
screening of applicants.  The AIU has grown dramatically, from four 
to eighty-seven civilian staff members, and has created a system 
whereby uniformed staff can provide support as needed.200 
Third, the Monitor also confirmed that the DOC continues to 
maintain an objective process for selection and hiring that adheres to 
clearly identified standards, criteria, and other selection parameters 
established by laws and regulations.201  The AIU has developed an 
objective screening process that assesses candidates based on 
employment history, criminal history, relationships with gangs or 
current inmates, medical screenings, and credit and background 
checks.202  This objective process also includes automatic disqualifiers 
like work dismissals, arrests, and driving violations.203  The AIU has 
also expanded its medical and psychological testing team to conduct 
those screenings.204 
Fourth, the Monitor also found that the DOC’s policies on 
promotions are now consistent with the consent decree, and a review 
of recent promotions has demonstrated that the policies are being 
adhered to.205 
The Monitor has also highlighted several areas for improvement.  
First, the Monitor has expressed concern over scenarios where AIU 
primary investigators have raised red flags for several candidates and 
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then proceeded to hire them without any documented explanation of 
why the red flag was disregarded or overridden.206  Examples of these 
red flags included criminal histories, contact with inmates on Rikers, a 
history of domestic violence, and failed psychological screenings for 
other city jobs.207  The Monitor investigated these specific 
applications and found that the AIU’s decisions to overlook the red 
flags were reasonable, but stressed the need to document the reasons 
for these decisions.208 
Second, the Monitor has also found that due to the unprecedented 
volume of training efforts and resources required, the original one-
year deadline set in the consent decree is unrealistic.209  Not only does 
the DOC need to cover operations while staff are being trained, but 
they also do not have adequate space for training.210  The Monitor has 
consistently and strongly urged the City of New York to create a new 
training facility for the DOC; lack of quality training space has made 
it incredibly difficult for the DOC to carry out the training 
requirements of the consent decree.211  To its credit, the city has also 
included $100 million in the fiscal year 2018 budget for a new training 
academy.212  That said, the DOC has requested an extension to the 
deadline for training requirements.213 
c. Young Inmate Management—Classification and Programming 
In the fourth monitors report, it is noted that young inmates under 
the age of nineteen continue to contribute to a disproportionate share 
of both the DOC’s use-of-force and inmate-on-inmate violence.214  
However, the DOC had made significant progress in increasing 
programming for young people, which reduces idle time and, in turn, 
reduces violence.215 
First, the DOC began working with an external consultant shortly 
after the conclusion of the most recent monitoring period in order to 
validate the existing classification tool.216  The DOC also recently 
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devised and began using an evidence-based classification model 
known as the Housing Unit Balancer (“HUB”).217  This tool was 
developed based on the analysis of approximately 60,000 DOC 
inmate records (including adolescent males), and uses a conditional 
(“if, then”) decision tree model to classify inmates according to 
violent conduct, mental health issues, age, severity of charge, gang-
affiliation, and number of prior arrests.218  Under the HUB model, 
inmates are assessed every 100 days, or after each violent incident, 
and classified as minimum, minimum-medium, medium-maximum, or 
maximum, and housed accordingly.219  The HUB system has an 
override mechanism, so that both adult and adolescent inmates with 
special circumstances (such mental health issues or emotional 
immaturity) can be placed in the appropriate housing option.220  The 
DOC plans to ultimately use this classification system across all DOC 
facilities, for all populations.221 
However, the Monitor has expressed concern in areas related to 
young adult classification and programming.  Moreover, the DOC’s 
new HUB classification system has been determined unfit for 
classifying adolescents, and the DOC must either create a new, 
evidence-based classification instrument from scratch or pilot a model 
currently used in another context for classifying adolescents.222 
Second, the DOC has been working with the Monitor to develop 
plans to deliver direct supervision training to staff,223 but it is 
important to note that the physical layout of all existing facilities on 
Rikers Island and the Brooklyn House of Detention are not in line 
with the design requirements of direct supervision, which will make 
adoption of this training model more challenging than in a more 
modern facility.224 
Finally, in addition to the previous abolition of the practice of 
punitive segregation for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in 
December 2014, the DOC abolished the use of punitive segregation 
for eighteen-year-old inmates on June 30, 2016.225  In earlier reviews, 
the Monitor expressed concern about the sustainability of this 
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practice since other disciplinary sanctions had not been fleshed out.226  
By the end of the third monitoring period, the DOC demonstrated 
promising efforts to increase alternative forms of discipline for young 
inmates.227  But the Monitor warned that alternative disciplinary 
programs, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, are a drastic shift 
from the DOC’s status quo and will need significant time to become a 
successful replacement.228 
C. Current Agenda for Reform 
Throughout the years, the strongest sources pushing for DOC 
reform have been the courts and legal advocates, through litigation 
efforts.  This kind of litigation strategy is popular across the United 
States: at one point, nearly one third of large U.S. prisons were under 
court orders to address unconstitutional conditions of confinement.229  
One of the primary purposes of litigation is to deter unacceptable 
conduct or conditions, and specifically in the case of corrections, it 
can serve to create a space where inmates are treated with respect 
and as citizens.230 
However, the DOC has historically not treated settlements as 
essential tools to help guide long-term structural reforms.  The key 
examples of the DOC’s litigation history from Rhem to Benjamin and 
Fisher to Nunez—though by no means an exhaustive account—reveal 
a pattern of illegal treatment of incarcerated people followed by 
successful lawsuits against the DOC that resulted in piecemeal 
responses rather than a holistic strategy for reform.231  This stems 
partly from a consistent turnover of DOC leadership and outside 
experts as well as an absence of strong reform precedents in the 
DOC.232  That said, the presence of the Nunez Monitor, the release of 
the Commission’s report, and the mayor’s commitment to closing 
Rikers Island all present critical opportunities to implement 
comprehensive reforms at the DOC. 
As previously mentioned, the Commission recommended closing 
Rikers Island and redeveloping borough-based jails in order to create 
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a smaller, safer, more humane and effective jail system for New York 
City.233 
The DOC is a frequent target of public outrage, advocacy, and 
legal action.234  But history has shown that even scandal and outrage 
are not enough to change the culture of the DOC.235  Lasting change 
will require deliberate analysis, strategic planning, and execution over 
a long period of time.  In order to take full advantage of this rare 
opportunity of galvanized political will for closing Rikers Island, 
reforming the broader criminal justice system, and building new state-
of-the-art borough-based jails, the city and the DOC should prioritize 
organizational culture reform. 
II.  ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE 
Part II turns to a critical piece of the comprehensive reform 
agenda—culture change.  Reforming the DOC culture, and thus, 
operations, will be difficult and will not be immediate.  But, to fully 
realize the mayor’s goal of a smaller, safer, fairer jail system, it is 
necessary. 
The subsequent sections outline the tenants of organizational 
culture change and culture change specific to correctional institutions, 
and then focus specifically on five critical areas for developing a 
culture change plan, including: accountability in management and 
performance; procedures and policies; recruiting and hiring; training 
and education; and wellbeing and support.  These five areas do not 
exhaustively cover the challenges facing the DOC, rather, they are 
critical areas to take into account when devising a comprehensive 
strategic plan for organizational culture change for the DOC. 
A. Changing the Culture at the DOC 
The following sections will explore organizational culture and its 
relationship to the DOC’s operations.  This section first outlines a 
process for understanding and evaluating organizational culture.  
Next, this section turns to developing a plan for reform.  Finally, this 
section outlines priority areas for operational reform in order to 
fundamentally change the organizational culture in the DOC. 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 15; see also discussion 
supra Introduction. 
 234. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 73–75. 
 235. See generally, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 95. 
404 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
1. Understanding Organizational Culture 
Understanding organizational culture theory is important when 
assessing and developing a reform plan for the DOC.  According to 
the Competing Values Framework, developed by Kim Cameron and 
Robert Quinn, an organization’s culture can be defined by how it 
balances its internal and external priorities, or how it values flexibility 
and agility versus structure and control.236  Cameron and Quinn 
identify four types of organizational culture: adhocracy, market, clan, 
and hierarchical.237  Correctional organizations typically fall under the 
“hierarchical” category, which describes organizations that are 
internally focused and prioritize well-defined responsibilities, 
structure, and control over flexibility, collaboration, and agility.238  
Another way to categorize organizational culture is according to 
Roger Harrison’s four typologies: power orientation, task orientation, 
person orientation, and role orientation.239  Role orientation would 
appear to be the most apt descriptor of the DOC, as well as of other 
public bureaucracies, because it relies on procedures and rules to 
maintain order, with fixed rights and privileges for staff that follow 
those rules.240 
However, organizations are rarely fully consistent or monolithic.  
When major elements of an organization, such as its leadership or 
mission, change frequently, it is more likely that the organization will 
split into differentiated or fragmented cultures—known as 
“subcultures.”241  In fact, culture change efforts often reveal extensive 
fragmentation of priorities within an organization and can lead to an 
“us versus them” attitude that pits different staff divisions against one 
another, creating inefficiencies and limiting collaboration.242  The 
beliefs, assumptions, and values of these subcultures may be at odds 
with each other, ultimately detracting from an overall organizational 
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mission.243  When pursuing change in any form, organizational 
leadership tends to push forward piecemeal solutions that cannot 
produce the desired holistic outcome, and ends up encouraging 
different staff groups to isolate themselves deeper into silos.244 
2. How Organizational Culture Develops and Sustains 
Cultures in organizations develop through staff interactions as they 
learn how to do their jobs according to what the organization has 
expected and has deemed effective.245  Grounded in communication, 
cultures both show and tell participants the rules of survival in a given 
context.246  Culture is largely created unconsciously or covertly, 
meaning that the forces that create and maintain culture are generally 
invisible.247  There are, however, many observable manifestations that 
can shed light on what is happening beneath the surface: culture is 
reflected in members’ interpersonal interactions, in the unwritten 
rules for getting along, in the climate or mood within a physical space, 
in celebrations, and in other ways.248 
Once established, culture becomes deep and pervasive.249  Culture 
affects an organization’s operations and becomes inextricably linked 
to the personality and identity of an organization and its staff.250  At 
the deepest level of an organization’s culture lies shared underlying 
assumptions about the workplace—theories about “the way things 
are” that are not debatable within the context of the organization or 
the field.251  Imagining a reality outside of these shared assumptions 
can be quite challenging: the longer an organizational culture has 
been reinforced, the more difficult it is to change.252  Although 
bringing in new members to the organization seemingly offers an 
opportunity to reexamine the organization’s culture, new employees 
are more likely to adopt the existing culture than to change it.253  
When attempts are made to change an organization’s culture, those 
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attempts often generate extreme anxiety among its members.254  
Members may feel such a change is akin to stripping them of their 
“sense of self.”255 
3. Specific Culture Issues in Correctional Organizations 
Correctional organizations are often characterized by conflicting 
pressures imposed by policy, public opinion, and the organizational 
cultural issues endemic to many criminal justice and law enforcement 
organizations.256  The DOC certainly experiences these conflicting 
pressures.257  The National Institute of Corrections (“NIC”) found 
that, across dozens of correctional institutions, the most common 
issues between various divisions of staff were low levels of trust and 
respect, poor communication, unclear expectations for performance, 
and a lack of recognition for achievements.258  Fragmentation of staff 
into silos with distinct, and often competing, subcultures is common in 
correctional organizations, with tensions found between virtually 
every division of staff, both vertically and horizontally.259  
Fragmentation can result in poor communication of expectations 
between silos, which leads to mutual lack of trust and respect and can 
eventually foster an environment that breeds apathy and frustration 
towards the organization itself.260  It is not uncommon for 
organizations with a fragmented staff to also experience staff conduct 
issues such as corruption, sexual abuse, and overuse of force.261  
These negative actions could be mitigated through the 
implementation of more supportive work environments with 
flexibility and discretion built in for officers.262 
Correctional organizations focus on preparing staff to react to 
catastrophe instantly.263  As a result, they are preoccupied with failure 
and reluctant to streamline inefficient processes due to fear of any 
gaps or oversights that might lead to disasters, such as an escape or 
death.264  For this reason, in addition to being hierarchical 
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establishments, correctional organizations tend to rely on redundancy 
and are excessively bureaucratic as a way to eliminate risk.265  Most 
correctional organizations are biased towards pre-existing expertise 
and skill as a way to respond to crisis, rather than looking to 
innovation and new ideas to alter the overall approach of the 
organization.266  The DOC is particularly reliant on redundancy as a 
security measure; it has a staffing ratio of one officer per incarcerated 
individual, which is higher than most staffing ratios at similar 
institutions across the country.267 
4. Impacts of Conflict Between Treatment and Custody 
All correctional institutions across the world operate under some 
sort of custody model, and most incorporate rehabilitation to varying 
degrees.268  The custody model is based on the idea that the sole 
purpose of corrections is to protect the community by detaining 
people who may pose a threat to public safety.269  This approach 
requires social distance between staff and inmates: no informal 
relationships or affective ties are formed so that staff can exercise 
coercive power.270  In an effort to maintain this social distance, staff 
must rely on following specific orders and avoiding decisions based on 
judgment or nuance—in order for staff’s authority to be perceived as 
legitimate, discretionary rule-enforcement is discouraged.271  
Performance is assessed objectively according to statistics around 
adherence to rules, and success is measured by a low rate of over-
exertion of force.272  In the custody model, order is maintained 
through punitive measures.273  The punitive trend that has existed for 
many years in U.S. corrections suggests that U.S. correctional 
institutions have been prioritizing the custody model over the 
rehabilitative approach to incarceration.274 
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The rehabilitative model for correctional environments requires 
staff to develop effective ties with incarcerated persons and enforce 
rules with discretion according to a nuanced understanding of inmates 
and their behavior.275  Staff still manage the incarcerated population 
through communication and some behavioral incentives, but this 
requires great technical skill and a strong commitment to these 
ideals.276 
In contrast to many prisons in Central Europe and Scandinavia,277 
which lean very strongly toward rehabilitative principles, most U.S. 
institutions over the past several decades have resisted the concept of 
rehabilitation in favor of a “tough-on-crime” approach.278  However, 
even as incarceration rates have risen, policy changes and litigation 
have forced improved conditions of confinement and protections 
from punitive action by COs.279  This trend has resulted in somewhat 
improved conditions of confinement in places where administrations 
have embraced reforms.280  Litigation tends to result in mandated 
reforms and restrictions on staff, limiting the coercive power of 
COs.281 
When COs are expected to perform both custody and treatment 
functions, this sets up a conflict of roles for staff.282  Though line 
officers are expected to remain socially distant to maintain order, they 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See generally ROBERT G. LEGER & JOHN R. STRATTON, SOCIOLOGY OF 
CORRECTIONS: A BOOK OF READINGS 1–7 (1977). 
 276. Id. at 446–48. 
 277. While the Scandinavian philosophy is instructive, it is important to note the 
differences between jails and prisons.  In the United States, jails are local facilities 
that hold individuals pending trial and for sentences of a term of less than a year 
while prisons hold individuals sentenced to terms of more than a year.  This presents 
distinct operational challenges as well as opportunities. 
 278. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN & ALISON SHAMES, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, 
SENTENCING AND PRISON PRACTICES IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 7 (2013), https://storage.googleapis.com/
vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/sentencing-and-prison-practices-in-germany-
and-the-netherlands-implications-for-the-united-states/legacy_downloads/european-
american-prison-report-v3.pdf [http://perma.cc/63V2-T839]; Doran Larson, Why 
Scandinavian Prisons Are Superior, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/why-scandinavian-prisons-
are-superior/279949/ [http://perma.cc/PBD8-FHTV]; see also supra Section I.A.2. 
 279. See generally Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Alienation in Prison: An 
Examination of the Work Relations of Prison Guards, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 251, 252–53, 
256, 264 (1981). 
 280. James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960–80, 
2 CRIME & JUST. 429, 462–63, 465 (1980). 
 281. See Poole & Regoli, supra note 279, at 252–53. 
 282. Oscar Grusky, Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp 
Officials, 3 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 452, 455 (1959). 
2018] BEYOND THE ISLAND 409 
are also increasingly urged to form close, supportive relationships 
with inmates and guide them to make their own decisions.283  Custody 
goals and rehabilitative goals are typically at odds by definition, and if 
organizational leadership does not develop a comprehensive strategy 
to integrate the two models, correctional staff will often encounter 
role strain and role conflict.284  Role strain refers to the tensions that 
an employee experiences when different duties within his or her role 
are difficult to achieve simultaneously.285  Role conflict is when one 
employee has multiple, distinct roles that are incompatible.286 
When faced with too much role conflict, officers are more likely to 
revert to the custody model of coercive and punitive control because 
its clear guidelines and results can be more easily measured.287  The 
adoption of new cultural ideals, such as rehabilitation models, must 
be accompanied by a clear and direct tool of measurement for 
success.288 
For long-term change to take hold, organizations and their staff 
must go through a process of reframing and redefining roles and 
missions so that old operations no longer seem acceptable.289  
Elements of an organization’s culture, such as shared attitudes, 
assumptions, beliefs, and behaviors guide individuals in managing 
how to work and survive together.290  Since a group’s attitudes, 
assumptions, and beliefs develop out of the need for consistency and 
meaning, any efforts to adjust an organization’s culture must address 
these needs as they progress.291  Unless these elements and functions 
are recognized and addressed, the appropriate route to culture 
change will never be understood, let alone embraced.292 
5. How Organizations Can Change 
Organizational culture is dynamic and can be influenced by a 
number of changes to an organization.  In some cases, promoting 
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members of certain subcultures within an organization can spread 
that subculture more widely within the organization.293  Culture 
change can also be galvanized through scandal or public crisis – when 
major issues are brought to light, organizations may seek radical 
change in order to survive.294  Moreover, new technologies can be 
incorporated that neutralize certain problematic processes that were 
once left up to discretion—like body cameras and digitized systems 
that flag officers that show signs of abuse or distress.295 
Organizations hoping to see lasting change will undoubtedly face 
resistance, confusion, and anxiety in the process.296  Culture change 
expert Edgar Schein describes five principles that an organization 
needs to accept—and be prepared to deal with—in order to effect 
true change: (1) staff must feel more survival anxiety, or fear of failing 
in their roles, than they feel anxiety about learning new things; 
(2) leaders pushing for organizational culture change must focus their 
efforts on reducing anxiety related to learning new things (rather than 
increasing survival anxiety); (3) goals of the change must be defined 
concretely in relation to the specific problems at hand (rather than 
merely referred to as “culture change”); (4) new cultural elements 
will only be embraced if they lead to positive results and satisfaction; 
and (5) cultural change will be at first psychologically painful, so 
efforts must be made to ensure psychological safety for staff.297 
Creating and sustaining psychological safety for staff is one of the 
most crucial components of culture change efforts.  Staff within an 
organization undergoing culture change often experience many types 
of fear: fear of losing power or position, of incompetence, of 
punishment, and of losing identity or group membership.298  These 
fears are powerful, and collectively can significantly undermine 
reform strategies.299  Thus, successful cultural change in an 
organization requires the existence of psychological safety. 
Psychological safety can be achieved through: the development of a 
compelling positive vision; adequate formal and informal training; 
involving the learner in managing the process; flexibility for practice; 
support groups for processes; and new systems and structures that 
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reinforce new ideals.300  These reforms must be rolled out 
strategically to create the safety that staff need in order to embrace 
change in their organization.301  It is important to note that even if the 
correct problems are identified and the staff is willing, change 
attempts will fall flat if the organization rushes to implement changes 
without taking the necessary time and thought to put together a long-
term, sustainable strategy.302 
a. Culture Change in Correctional Systems 
The NIC has been investigating and facilitating cultural 
assessments and change processes within correctional organizations 
since 2000.303  The NIC endorses the principles laid out by change 
management expert Dr. John P. Kotter.304  Kotter’s principles have 
been incorporated into many successful organizational change 
efforts.305  In order for change to occur, Kotter recommends the 
following: (1) inspire a sense of urgency amongst critical stakeholders 
to create and maintain the momentum required to push change 
forward; (2) have a Change Team of respected senior managers who 
are committed to the goals of the change; (3) establish an emotionally 
charged vision that can be easily communicated, inspires staff, and 
addresses their primary fears regarding the change; (4) learn about 
each stakeholder’s best interests in order to build buy-in; (5) provide 
clear tools for action so that staff are empowered to make the change; 
(6) present short-term, achievable milestones and finish them before 
moving on; (7) never stop highlighting these achievements and 
pushing for further progress; and (8) provide positive reinforcement 
for successes to encourage sustainable change.306 
The NIC has used these principles as inspiration to create its own 
change management model specifically for corrections called 
Achieving Performance Excellence Initiative (“APEX”).307  APEX is 
a roadmap and toolkit that can help correctional institutions 
understand where to begin and what steps are necessary to effect 
lasting culture change.308  The APEX model incorporates best 
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practices from organizational change processes in general, with an 
emphasis on those that are particularly relevant to correctional 
organizations.309  APEX advocates for a system-wide approach that 
acknowledges that every piece of the culture change process will 
affect every part of the organization.310  The steps of APEX are as 
follows: (1) plan and assess; (2) define the goal; (3) organize for 
results; (4) plan the implementation strategy; (5) implement the 
change management plan; and (6) sustain the change effort.311 
Under the APEX model, the first step for any culture change 
process is an informal self-assessment.312  Though there are many 
existing tools for organizational self-assessment, APEX has created 
its own tool specific to corrections called the APEX Assessment 
Tools Protocol.313  It includes the APEX Screener, the APEX 
Organization Profile, and the APEX Inventory.314  The APEX 
Screener is a brief, twenty-four question survey to assess staff’s 
concerns and readiness for change.315  The APEX organizational 
profile provides questions for leadership and staff that are specifically 
targeted at analyzing operations, environment, relationships, and 
performance.316  The APEX Inventory offers a more comprehensive 
assessment of readiness for change, along with guidance for how 
management can operationalize change.317 
An assessment of an organization’s culture that is superficial can 
end up doing more harm than good.  For example, analysis and 
decisions based simply on reported data without an understanding of 
underlying dynamics will most likely lead to culture change failure.318  
Even when a comprehensive analysis is undertaken, if the 
organization is not prepared to address the anxiety, anger, and 
resistance that this analysis may engender among some of its 
members, then culture change will still fail.319 
The next step is identifying the goal and objectives of the change 
process.  APEX recommends a clear definition for why change is 
necessary, along with a specific vision for the future of the 
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organization.320  Leadership should then identify specific practices, 
behaviors, and procedures that are top priority for the change, as well 
as who will be affected and how.321  Most importantly, leadership 
needs to consider how it will know when it meets its goals and how to 
measure its success.322  Communication is critical to this process: 
organizations should develop an “elevator pitch” that can clearly 
convey the goals to all staff.323 
Organizing for results entails bringing the entire leadership team 
on board and creating specific roles to lead the change.324  These roles 
would include a specific change leader and supporting change team, 
and a steering committee.325  A significant responsibility of the 
change leadership is to manage relationships with all stakeholders, 
especially with managers who are not directly involved in the 
process.326 
The change team then develops the detailed implementation plan, 
a project management tool for the organization to follow as it goes 
through the change process.327  APEX recommends key steps to be 
included in this process—such as conducting surveys, focus groups, 
and interviews to understand social dynamics in the organization, 
identifying successes or failures of any prior change efforts, or coming 
up with a communications strategy for the plan—but also recognizing 
that there is no single correct way for an organization to undertake 
this process.328 
The next step is to actually implement the carefully developed 
strategic plan.329  APEX recommends having an intervention team 
execute the specialized tasks involved in coming up with plans for 
specific processes.330  The change team should monitor and track 
progress, and keep all staff as informed as possible.331  
Communication of why and how changes are being implemented is 
                                                                                                                 
 320. See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 28. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 29. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 30. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 31. 
 329. Id. at 36. 
 330. Id. at 32. 
 331. Id. at 36. 
414 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
perhaps the most important element of any change management 
process.332 
The final, perhaps most difficult, stage involves sustainability.333  
Organizational change can only last if changes are embraced by staff 
and accompanied by positive reinforcement as well as ongoing 
guidance and training.334  Management must be held accountable for 
the success of implemented changes, and progress must be tracked on 
an ongoing basis.335 
b. Case Study: Virginia Department of Corrections and a Healing 
Environment 
Organizational culture change is not a common undertaking for 
correctional organizations.  However, the Virginia Department of 
Corrections (“VADOC”) is currently in the midst of a massive 
culture change initiative aimed at creating a “healing environment” 
within the agency.336  The initiative began in 2010 when VADOC 
began investigating its effectiveness in reducing recidivism within 
Virginia’s criminal justice system.337  In an evaluation of its programs 
and services, the VADOC recognized that it could only have an 
impact on recidivism rates if it assessed and changed its 
organizational culture.338 
VADOC Director Harold W. Clarke aimed to create a strategic 
plan for culture change by assessing staff attitudes and experiences, 
how the institution was perceived by external entities, and how care 
was received by the incarcerated population.339  All staff members 
received specific training on how to participate in the culture change 
effort as well as what his or her role would be in carrying out culture 
change goals.340  The strategic planning efforts resulted in the 
“healing environment”—a cultural model for the organization that 
aimed to create productive change for both staff and those 
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incarcerated.341  Unlike “command and control,” this model 
prioritized mutual respect and de-escalation techniques to restore 
peace in the correctional setting.342  Through the healing environment 
model, use of force was deemphasized and a continuum of responses 
for various infractions was introduced.343 
A key element of VADOC’s healing environment was a practice 
known as “Dialogue,” which establishes a structured model for staff-
wide discussions about the most pressing issues involved in the 
culture change process.344  It requires specific training to provide staff 
with the skills necessary to listen without judgment, effectively 
creating a safe space that encourages staff to share their thoughts and 
experiences, and also allows leadership to gauge how culture change 
is progressing.345  In Virginia, this training was carried out by 
“learning teams,” interdisciplinary groups of staff selected by 
leadership in each facility who were trained by Dialogue coaches.346 
The critical component of Dialogue is that it does not stop once 
culture change efforts have been implemented—it is an ongoing part 
of the process and necessary to sustaining positive change.347 
The Urban Institute, an economic and social policy think tank, is 
currently conducting an evaluation of this initiative at VADOC, and 
has released interim data showing that Dialogue has likely led to an 
increase in staff support for culture change initiatives at VADOC.348 
B. Developing a Culture Change Plan at the New York City 
Department of Correction 
As New York City prepares to shutter Rikers Island and move to 
new, borough-based facilities, the DOC has a unique opportunity to 
reimagine its role and make strides towards a more humane jail 
system.349  The goals of such a process would be to dramatically 
improve professionalism, mental and emotional balance, 
transparency, and accountability in order to significantly reduce 
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violence and improve outcomes.  It will require fierce commitment 
from leadership and the recognition that culture change is extremely 
difficult, as well as acceptance of some risks.350 
While the DOC may decide to work with an external consultant to 
assess their culture and develop a strategic plan, any culture change 
or strategic planning consultants should approach the process as a 
discovery process that focuses on asking the right questions and 
helping the organization arrive at conclusions on its own.351 
Should the DOC choose to undergo an assessment and develop a 
comprehensive plan for reform, this Article recommends several 
specific areas of focus for analysis: (1) accountability in management 
and performance; (2) formal processes and procedures; (3) recruiting 
and hiring; (4) training and professionalization of staff; and (5) staff 
wellbeing.  The following section analyzes each of these areas in turn, 
highlighting ongoing, manifest issues at the DOC. 
1. Accountability in Management and Performance 
The legitimacy of reform efforts hinges on correctional leadership 
at all levels of management taking responsibility for the DOC’s 
performance and progress during the process.352  Organizational 
leaders must evaluate all levels of their staff according to new culture 
ideals and provide them with positive or negative reinforcement in 
accordance with their adoption of the new principles.353 
a. Effective Management as the Primary Driver of Accountability 
Dramatic changes in performance are more likely if culture change 
is led by a “transformational leader”—someone who has the skills to 
influence and inspire organizational commitment amongst staff.354 
The NIC has developed standards for correctional leadership 
known as the Correctional Leadership Competencies for the 21st 
Century (“CLC”).355  The CLC holds accountability as one of the key 
values of successful correctional management.356  The CLC model 
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identifies key competencies required for executive and senior 
leadership, which include: publicly acknowledging and rewarding 
behavior that encompasses organizational values; working 
strategically with investigators and auditors to enable accurate data 
collection and reinforce ethical values; explicitly modeling behaviors 
that the organization wants to promote; clearly aligning rewards and 
discipline with desired behaviors and values; setting clear boundaries 
around acceptable and unacceptable behavior; and addressing 
misconduct fairly, decisively, and in a timely manner.357 
As discussed previously, the Nunez complaint cited a long history 
of the DOC’s failures to select and promote managers with a 
commitment to ending violence or to ensure appropriate 
investigations and discipline of staff.358  Other recent events highlight 
a serious lack of accountability within the DOC’s middle-
management, who should be setting the standard for staff behavior 
and transparency.  For example, an August 2016 Daily News report 
contained internal documents and anonymous staff accounts claiming 
that administrators had been ordering officers to make use-of-force 
statistics “go away.”359  At least one of the administrators involved 
was later promoted.360 
Most critiques of accountability, particularly in the form of 
litigation, within the DOC center on its chronic use-of-force issues.361  
The DOC’s culture of violence is a frequent target of public outrage, 
advocacy, and legal action.362  But the lack of accountability at the 
DOC is not limited to the area of violence—the DOC has 
underperformed in areas ranging from hiring to investigations to data 
tracking to training.363  By failing to take responsibility, management 
sends the message to staff that integrity, ethics, and performance are 
not top priorities for the DOC.  Taking action against misconduct 
while rewarding staff who demonstrate the desired cultural principles 
can reinforce the culture that the DOC hopes to promote.364 
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b. Strong Performance Measurement Facilitates Greater 
Accountability 
A recent trend in performance management in corrections is to 
broaden the scope of indicators to include community-based 
outcomes as well as departmental outputs.365  In effect, these systems 
collect two kinds of data: outputs that departments or programs can 
directly control (such as number of classes taught and number of 
times COs used alternatives to punitive segregation), and outcomes 
that programs and departments can only influence (like recidivism 
rates and gainful employment for formerly incarcerated people).366  
Organizational leaders must work with staff to help them understand 
which indicators they can directly control and are therefore 
responsible for, and which they can only influence and therefore 
should see as part of the larger picture towards improving the 
criminal justice system.367  This requires leaders to demonstrate and 
reinforce the link between internal indicators and broader criminal 
justice issues, which can connect internal culture change efforts to the 
big picture.368 
Performance reports must be used as learning opportunities rather 
than merely making information available.369  For performance 
measurement systems to function most effectively, all staff who are 
held accountable to these measures must have structured 
opportunities for face-to-face dialogue to raise concerns and 
questions with organizational leaders, and they must be involved in 
the brainstorming process regarding what should be measured and 
the best approaches for measuring.370  The most successful 
measurement efforts have leaders who reward staff success frequently 
in structured ways: rituals, celebrations, and retreats provide 
opportunities for staff to be unified around the purpose of the 
performance measurement effort and recognized publicly for their 
successes.371 
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The most successful performance measurement systems are framed 
as part of the “DNA” of the department, and are managed by a 
program director with no other responsibilities.372  This sends a 
message that performance measurement is enough of a priority to 
bring on specialized staff for this purpose.373  This person must be a 
“champion of the cause” and have the communications skills 
necessary to keep staff on board.374  Correctional organizations with a 
clear chain of command with one director who will assess overall 
performance are more successful at implementing performance 
measurement systems than those with decentralized management 
structures.375  Centralized leadership, combined with frequent 
meetings and face-to-face interactions, is key to maintaining 
compliance across internal departments or units.376 
The DOC currently employs a performance measurement system 
called Total Efficiency Accountability Management System 
(“TEAMS”), which was implemented in 1995 in response to 
prevalent inmate-on-inmate violence.377  During the first decade it 
was implemented, it drastically improved CO performance.378  
However, while it was once a core element of the DOC’s operating 
strategy, TEAMS now appears to be used as a monthly check-in 
amongst DOC leadership.379  Reform efforts are impossible to sustain 
without prioritizing accountability and performance across the DOC, 
starting with its leadership. 
Ideally, the aim of TEAMS is to connect the roles of staff within 
individual units to the mission of the overall agency, rather than 
keeping staff in silos.380  To this end, TEAMS sets agency-wide 
agendas, and then tracks data and performance reported by staff 
according to these agendas by unit.381  TEAMS works by identifying 
dozens of monthly performance indicators in the reports collected 
related to use of force, inmate violence, use of services, maintenance, 
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overtime, and other areas.382  Top uniform and civilian leadership 
then create a monthly report that serves as the focus of monthly 
TEAMS meetings, during which the leaders of each facility give 
presentations to a large group of supervisors who set expectations for 
next steps.383  The monthly meetings serve to share progress, identify 
problems, and build strategies for improvement among staff.384  The 
role of TEAMS in the DOC could be restored to its original strategic 
importance as an integrated management tool that is actionable and 
broadened to include more levels of staff.385 
c. Integrity of Data 
Despite reportedly still having TEAMS in place, investigators and 
monitors have found that line staff are not being held accountable by 
leadership for inaccurate or incomplete reporting.  In particular, 
incomplete records on use of force, medical issues, and maintenance 
needs have made it impossible for the DOC or any oversight body to 
accurately evaluate performance.386  The monitoring team in Nunez 
analyzed the DOC’s data reporting processes and found that staff 
often do not fill out reports accurately, and that they tend to leave out 
important details when reports involve use of force.387  The 
incompleteness of the data undermines efforts to measure 
performance.388  A commitment to accuracy is critical to tracking and 
evaluating the performance of the DOC and its reform efforts. 
d. Using Data as an Evidence Base for Management Decisions 
Successful culture change requires organizational leaders to be 
explicit about how staff performance will be evaluated and what the 
consequences are of not upholding new cultural principles.389  Though 
the DOC is currently working with the Monitor to roll out a 
centralized CMS to systematically track use-of-force incidents, 
management should work closely with all levels of staff in order to 
develop appropriate metrics for performance management in all areas 
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in order to increase ownership of department-wide performance 
outcomes.390 
Currently, the DOC’s system only allows the person filling out a 
use-of-force report to provide a single reason for why a use-of-force 
incident occurred.  This oversimplifies the complex nature of these 
incidents and obscures what the motivation and drivers may be.391  
The system should be updated to allow for more nuanced accounting 
of events.  Staff must also be encouraged and rewarded for providing 
appropriately detailed information.392  This evidence base will allow 
investigators and supervisors alike to understand and address motives 
for staff behaviors. 
The DOC can also implement an Early Warning System (“EWS”), 
which is an evidence-based model of managing staff that could 
significantly reduce violence.393  EWSs are a relatively new tool for 
corrections, though commonly used by police departments.394  These 
systems use data to spot predictive indicators—such as a history of 
unprovoked violence, negative human resources performance 
reviews, or absenteeism—that a CO will pose a risk to the safety of its 
unit.395  However, agencies have had varying degrees of success with 
these types of models, depending on the data available.396  The DOC 
is currently using existing data streams to try to identify risk while 
working with the Monitor to develop its own EWS system.397  The 
success of this EWS program will be crucial to the performance of the 
DOC. 
2. Policies and Procedures 
While the DOC cannot rely fully on its formal processes and 
procedures to effect culture change, organizational operations are 
integrally related to culture.398  Culture change will require a re-
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envisioning of policies and operations that clearly stem from and 
reflect the vision for the organization going forward. 
a. Clarifying and Bringing Directives Up to Date 
A critical issue is the way the DOC policy is organized, accessed, 
and taught to staff.  All policy directives can be found on the DOC’s 
website, but many are out of date.399 
The DOC’s use-of-force directive is a case in point.  As noted 
above, a new use-of-force directive was introduced in 2016, but it has 
not been updated on the organization’s website.400  It is unclear how 
staff access directives and how often they are reviewed.  For example, 
the Nunez Monitor expressed concern for staff’s level of knowledge 
and competency around the use-of-force policy.401  The Monitor also 
found that the use-of-force directive did not provide specific how-to 
guidance for officers, nor did it clearly lay out staff responsibilities.402  
Although the Monitor primarily focuses on use of force, any 
operational assessment should consider the state of all policy 
directives that govern the daily operations of the DOC. 
An important step in changing the culture at the DOC would be to 
update the directives system and make it easily accessible to staff.  
Though updated directives and rules will not alone address the issues 
in the DOC, keeping a system of directives that is organized, up to 
date, and easy to navigate communicates to staff that adherence to 
policies is valuable to the organization, rather than a formality. 
It is impossible to guarantee that rules will dictate behavior—in 
fact, coercion alone has been shown not to be effective.403  But writing 
directives and policies that are as explicitly detailed as possible 
eliminates opportunities for interpretation and makes expectations 
clear.  Having an in-depth understanding of policy is critical for staff 
who often need to make discretionary decisions in unpredictable 
circumstances. 
b. Using an Evidence Base in Setting Policies and Procedures 
Many DOC policies and procedures are not evidence-based 
practices and do not set benchmark goals.  For example, the DOC 
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does not have the right metrics available to understand if its new 
Enhanced Supervision Housing program is successful at reducing 
violence.404  Implementing new programs without a clear sense of 
whether or not they will work can backfire.  In 2015, the DOC began 
a large undertaking to house young adults ages eighteen through 
twenty-one separately from the adult population, believing that this 
would help reduce violence.405  After spending significant resources to 
make this change, which affected every element of the organization 
from facilities to programming, it was discovered that violence 
increased in this unit.406  The DOC is now in the process of undoing 
this policy decision, gradually mixing younger people back in with the 
older population.407  Not only is this inefficient from a departmental 
resources perspective, but also it has led to additional violence and 
trauma for both staff and the incarcerated population that could have 
been avoided if evidence had been gathered before the policy 
decision had been made.  This approach further communicates to 
staff that there are not necessarily reasons for implementing certain 
policies over others, and thus undermines organizational operations. 
An evidence base is particularly important when it comes to 
classification of the incarcerated population, especially if the DOC is 
to move into a direct supervision model of management.408  The 
direct supervision philosophy holds that normalized environments 
inspire normal behavior, and that when staff can monitor the entire 
incarcerated population at once and are trained to deescalate tension 
using communication skills, they can keep violence at bay.409  This 
model is effective if strictly adhered to from a design and training 
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perspective.410  There is evidence that jails that use this model can see 
a thirty percent to ninety percent reduction in violence.411  The plan 
to dramatically reduce the number of people incarcerated in New 
York City, close Rikers Island, and refurbish or create new facilities 
in the five boroughs presents an ideal opportunity to transition to a 
direct supervision model.412  Since direct supervision is based on 
reducing staff supervision of the incarcerated population unless it is 
too risky to do so, an effective evidence-based classification system is 
key for this system to operate safely.413 
Generally, committing to the practice of using only evidence-based 
tools and policies is paramount to the performance of the agency and 
for achieving an organizational culture based on improving outcomes 
for the incarcerated population.  Employing valid and evidence-based 
strategies also contributes to a transparent and procedurally just 
culture.  Staff should always understand why they are expected to do 
certain things, as well as the expected outcome.  An important 
element of a successful culture change process is that staff feel safe in 
their expected roles and are comfortable with the objectives they are 
aiming for—this is necessary for staff to buy in to and be on board 
with proposed reform strategies.414 
3. Recruiting and Hiring for Culture Change 
As the gateway into the organization for new employees, the hiring 
and recruiting process is key to any organizational change efforts.  
While culture does drive staff behavior, organizational culture itself is 
collectively created by the shared experiences and learnings of 
staff.415  Staff are an agency’s greatest resource and have a profound 
impact on its performance, so it is imperative to hire staff that will be 
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open to the vision for the organization’s culture.416  The DOC needs 
to develop a vision for a new organizational culture and then hire 
staff who can help advance changes to make this vision a reality. 
a. A Historically Fraught System 
Recruiting and hiring practices at the DOC have likely contributed 
to culture issues surrounding staff misconduct and violence.  A 2015 
report by the New York City Department of Investigation (“DOI”) 
found that at least twenty-five percent of the DOC’s staff misconduct 
incidents during that year would have been avoided if the DOC had 
in place an adequate approach to screening and hiring COs.417  The 
DOI’s investigation found problems in the AIU that handles 
applications once they have been received by DOC.418  These 
problems resulted in the hiring of many COs who should either have 
not been hired, or should have been hired under conditions of close 
monitoring.419  The potentially disqualifying issues for these new hires 
included arrests for harassment, personality disorders, and close ties 
to currently incarcerated individuals.420  The AIU staff neither 
followed standard background check procedures nor monitored new 
hires with previous gang affiliations shared by inmates.421  Moreover, 
the investigation found that the approach to hiring was not 
strategically linked to the department-wide reform efforts.422 
A weak recruiting and hiring process is incredibly costly.  In 
addition to the dangers posed to inmates, staff who underperform or 
engage in misconduct and violence are an incredible financial burden 
on an organization.423  In fact, the DOC cost the city nearly $420 
million in personal injury settlements from 2009 to 2014.424  Even 
more importantly, hiring the wrong staff can completely undermine 
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any attempt to pursue an organizational culture that prioritizes 
rehabilitation and human dignity for those who are incarcerated. 
b. Strategic Hiring for Culture Change 
While the DOC is certainly improving its recruitment and hiring 
approaches,425 moving to a direct supervision system presents an 
opportunity for the DOC to use recruiting and hiring to intentionally 
spur changes to the organization’s culture.  Key to this process would 
be expanding the profile of the “ideal candidate” to diversify the 
range of skills and experience of DOC staff. 
Currently, the accepted qualifications for COs favor candidates 
with military or law enforcement backgrounds.426  As New York 
City’s model of incarceration shifts to focus increasingly on 
rehabilitation and programming, the DOC’s hiring team might 
consider recruiting candidates with experience and training relevant 
to these new priorities, including candidates with social work and 
mental health backgrounds.  The current requirements for 
employment as a CO include: sixty completed college credits (the 
equivalent of an associate degree); a high school diploma/GED plus 
two years honorable full-time U.S. military service; a high school 
diploma/GED plus two years of full time experience as a police 
officer, peace officer or its law enforcement equivalent; or six years of 
active U.S. Military Reserve service with an honorable discharge.427  
A four-year university degree is not a prerequisite for employment, 
which makes being a CO an attractive and well-paying profession for 
people with only associate degrees or military training.428  However, 
the DOC might consider requiring four-year university degrees for 
officers working with special populations like youth or those with 
mental illness.  Higher education helps foster the desire for continued 
learning and helps teach the skills and build the capacity necessary for 
acquiring new information.429  This is critical in a field like 
corrections, which is constantly evolving due to new research, policy, 
and societal changes, and which involves working with special 
populations like youth and people with mental illness.430  In general, 
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having college-level education makes it more likely that COs have 
had exposure to a diverse range of backgrounds different from their 
own, expanding their capacity for empathy; this exposure to 
difference is invaluable to learning potential ways to deescalate 
violent incidents.431  In order to recruit and hire the right staff for the 
mission and organizational culture the DOC would like to implement, 
it should create a comprehensive recruiting and hiring vision replete 
with a strategic plan that is directly in line with its overall culture 
change goals and efforts.  According to the Nunez Monitor, the AIU 
is about to undergo a comprehensive review process of all current 
practices and will then draft an overall strategy for going forward.432 
4. Training and Education as Tools for Culture Change 
A supportive and healing training program can create the 
psychological safety needed for staff to accept change, and it can also 
position staff as agents of change by helping them develop the skills 
necessary to sustain a healing culture in the organization.433  For a 
hierarchical structure like the DOC, the process of opening up 
dialogue across silos likely will be difficult and uncomfortable at first.  
These initial steps should be treated as an opportunity to build skills 
and train staff for ongoing dialogues among all levels in the DOC.  As 
seen in the Virginia Department of Corrections, staff likely will 
become accustomed to this new way of working and more willing and 
better positioned to contribute to innovation within the DOC.434 
a. Training for a Healing Environment 
Training plays a significant role in establishing legitimacy and 
procedural justice in a criminal justice setting: when correctional staff 
demonstrate competence and fairness in carrying out their jobs, the 
incarcerated population may be more likely to respect their 
authority.435  New York City’s Police Department is currently 
transitioning from a strictly “law and order” approach to a more 
“community-based policing” model.436  Its 2015 Neighborhood 
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Policing Plan emphasizes ongoing respectful engagement with citizens 
as the only way to properly maintain safety in the city.437  The DOC 
can learn from this initiative by making engagement, communication, 
and de-escalation—principles at the core of the direct supervision jail 
model—essential parts of its approach to maintaining safety.438 
A transition to a direct supervision model would require the DOC 
to build its entire training program around techniques that have 
typically been considered supplementary training modules.  A study 
on the full adoption of direct supervision principles in newly designed 
jails shows that facilities that focus on only the design elements of 
direct supervision, ignoring the training, management, and culture 
components, see status quo results in violence prevention.439  In fact, 
this happened at the Tombs, which is a direct supervision facility that 
has not been able to keep violence down, apparently due to 
mismanagement.440  In other cases, partial implementation is due to a 
misinterpretation of the direct supervision model, such as only placing 
COs in direct contact with inmates without providing a safe physical 
environment or ensuring the CO has the requisite communication 
skills to control the environment.441  Again, in facilities that have fully 
implemented direct supervision principles, violence drops 
dramatically.442  In those that adopted direct supervision in design 
only, violence was largely unaffected.443 
Therefore, the DOC must implement direct supervision 
comprehensively.  The difficulty of this task should not be 
understated.  The DOC has had, in the past two decades, 
commissioners who were committed to change and were able to make 
some important and invaluable reforms in the agency.444  The kind of 
culture change discussed in this Article will require not just that kind 
of leadership, though it is essential, but a long term commitment from 
the mayor, the budget director, the Office of Labor Relations, the 
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Mayor’s Office of Operations, the Department for Citywide 
Administrative Services, as well as the city council, among others.  
This is no small undertaking and without this kind of substantial 
commitment from all levels of city leadership, it is unlikely to happen. 
b. A Healing Environment Will Make Punitive Tools Obsolete 
A common criticism from staff at the DOC is that the recent 
reduction in the use of punitive measures for dealing with inmates 
leaves staff with no tools to curb violence.445  Decades of reliance on 
solitary confinement as a primary anti-violence tactic with only 
cursory attempts at providing alternatives has left staff feeling 
powerless against violence.446  A common response to this dilemma is 
to say that officers simply need more training.447 
The judicial response also has mirrored this approach.  For 
example, the consent decree in Nunez calls for many additional 
training programs in efforts to reduce violence in the DOC, focusing 
on use of force, conflict resolution and crisis intervention, defensive 
tactics, cell extractions, as well as procedures, skills, and techniques 
for investigating use-of-force incidents.448  Recently, the DOC has 
made great strides in rolling out its “Continuum of Alternative 
Disciplinary Responses,” and as of this writing is no longer using 
punitive segregation at all for sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds.449  This 
continuum includes several specialized housing options, depending on 
age and infraction, paired with programming aimed at behavioral 
change.450  COBA, which represents the COs currently being trained 
in these new strategies, strongly prefers the use of punitive 
segregation because officers feel vulnerable to violence without it.451  
Indeed, while the Monitor has found the drafting and testing of these 
new programs to be promising, it has warned that in order for 
correctional staff to feel secure without punitive segregation, these 
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new policies must be extremely clear and rolled out carefully.452  The 
monitoring team has also stressed that the DOC must expand the 
possible responses for mid-level misconduct that would not require 
the use of the specialized housing programs but should still be 
addressed.453 
If implemented properly, the direct supervision model will render 
punitive tactics practically obsolete.  As mentioned above, through 
direct supervision, staff manage inmates using communication, de-
escalation, as well as relationship-building and leadership skills.454  
Direct supervision principles should inform how all staff engage with 
the incarcerated population at all times, rather than as an 
afterthought. 
c. Redefining Staff Roles Through Professionalization 
As noted above, seeking a more professionalized staff by recruiting 
officers with higher education qualifications is one approach to 
changing the dynamics between COs and the incarcerated 
population.455  However, research has found that if underlying 
organizational culture issues are not addressed, hiring more educated 
and human-service oriented staff has little effect on changing 
culture.456  For this approach to be successful, staff must be fully 
integrated into strategic development and be fully capable of acting in 
accordance with reform goals.457 
Job redesign is an approach that concedes more autonomy and 
control over operations to lower-level staff, thus providing 
opportunities for enrichment through increased responsibility and 
challenge in the workplace.458  Staff should be trained with the skills 
and knowledge necessary to have more autonomy over their decision-
making, which can heighten their sense of personal responsibility and 
pride in their role.459 
                                                                                                                 
 452. If punitive segregation is no longer an option, it must be replaced with a clear 
program of graduated responses to violent behavior. 
 453. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 244. 
 454. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 455. See JOSI & SECHREST, supra note 429, at 46. 
 456. Nancy C. Jurik & Michael C. Musheno, The Internal Crisis of Corrections: 
Professionalization and the Work Environment, 3 JUST. Q. 457, 477 (1986). 
 457. See generally Richard F. Elmore, Organizational Models of Social Program 
Implementation, 26 PUB. POL’Y 188 (1978). 
 458. See John W. Slocum, Jr., Job Redesign: Improving the Quality of Working 
Life 5 (S. Methodist Univ, Working Paper No. 19, 1981). 
 459. ROGER CHEVALIER, A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO IMPROVING WORKPLACE 
PERFORMANCE 65–66 (2007). 
2018] BEYOND THE ISLAND 431 
Another approach is to develop an academic program for all staff 
that lasts between one and two years and that goes beyond traditional 
training modules to include fields such as criminal law, sociology, law 
enforcement history, and education.460  In German correctional 
institutions, often considered a global model, officers spend their two-
year probationary period learning self-defense and communication, as 
well as criminal law and educational theory.461  This professionalizes 
staff by providing them with skillsets found in professions requiring 
university degrees.462 
5. Wellbeing and Support for Staff 
Staff treatment and support are core elements of a positive 
organizational culture.463  This is particularly true in corrections 
considering the occupational stressors for correctional staff, which 
include fear of inmate violence, confrontation with inmate suicides, 
requirements to frequently work overtime, and demands of rotating 
shifts that can impede life outside of work.464  For correctional 
organizations to perform optimally and effectively, staff must be 
adequately supported and cared for.465  Adequate training of staff is 
also incredibly important to their wellbeing—when staff are 
inadequately trained, they can easily find themselves in situations that 
cause extreme stress and fear.466 
As recommended by the Commission, facilities should provide 
normalized spaces for staff that are separate from the incarcerated 
population and offer a sense of connection to the outside world.467  
The Commission recommended that these spaces would include 
natural materials, soft furniture, regular lamps and tables, and other 
every day furnishings.468  The value of natural light and temperature 
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control was also stressed.469  However, as with other improvements 
related to physical facilities, the changes will mean little without a 
complete overhaul of how staff wellbeing and health are considered 
within the DOC. 
Moreover, role conflict and unsupportive leadership can lead to 
many other conditions that afflict staff as they attempt to manage 
their relationships to their jobs and to their organization.  For 
instance, burnout is a syndrome of emotional exhaustion, 
depersonalization, and a reduced sense of personal accomplishment 
that is a considerable risk for correctional staff.470  Studies have 
shown that of all correctional personnel, staff in custody roles report 
higher levels of burnout.471 
Beyond being unpleasant, burnout can lead to officers becoming 
careless on the job and can pose risks to the safety of the correctional 
institution.472  This is an argument for providing ample support, 
challenge, and autonomy early in a CO’s career, when they are at 
greater risk of burning out. 
Though seniority on staff comes with benefits and perks, some of 
these may also be harmful.  For example, overtime allows officers to 
dramatically increase their wages; however, excessive overtime takes 
an emotional and physical toll on COs.473  The DOC has become 
dependent on overtime as a way to staff posts, particularly when 
officers need to miss shifts for training, and frames it as a “perk” even 
though it can be harmful to officers in the long run.474 
Developing and maintaining a supportive and healing culture is 
critical to staff wellbeing.  Jails are trauma-inducing environments.475  
The average CO will encounter twenty-eight first-hand events related 
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to serious violence, injury, or death within his or her career.476  Unlike 
police officers, COs experience a sustained threat of violence, and 
have fewer opportunities to build rewarding relationships with the 
populations they work with, given that those populations are being 
held against their will.477  Staff who are exposed to events involving 
violence, injury, or death on a recurring basis are more likely to 
develop post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and depressive 
disorders.478  These disorders can have dire consequences for staff—
one study found that COs’ suicide rate is thirty-nine percent greater 
than other professions, and double the rate of police officers.479 
The DOC should be proactive when it comes to ensuring the 
wellbeing of its staff.  When COs are happy, healthy, adequately 
trained, and well-supported, they create a more positive and 
supportive environment for incarcerated people, and can improve 
behavior while reducing violence and the need for punitive measures.  
These benefits, which serve both individuals and the organization, 
however, can only be achieved with meaningful commitment from 
leadership.480 
Currently, the DOC has a unit called the Correction Assistance 
Response for Employees (“CARE”).  The CARE unit exists to assist 
officers who seek counseling around traumatic experiences, anxiety, 
PTSD, and job-related stressors, among other needs.481  Officers 
needing additional services or treatment are referred elsewhere by 
the unit.482  However, there is a strong stigma in correctional culture 
against seeking mental health treatment.  David Fullard describes a 
“warrior ethos” in corrections, where COs are expected by their peers 
and supervisions to never show weakness, accept defeat, quit, or 
admit illness, making it much less likely that staff will seek help to 
cope with the extreme stress of the job.483  An additional challenge 
with internal CARE units is that they may be perceived as an 
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extension of the organization, and therefore may not be as trusted by 
staff who are dealing with issues resulting from organizational 
stressors.484  One solution may be off-site facilities with strict 
confidentiality regulations that ensure the DOC is only informed of 
mental health issues in extreme cases. 
A critical part of a larger culture change effort would be to help 
shift the stigma around mental health within its own organizational 
culture.485  Though seemingly insignificant, vocabulary around mental 
health has a large impact on staff perception and says a lot about its 
culture.486  The DOC can seek to normalize and neutralize 
conversations around mental health and incorporate healing practices 
such as the Dialogue process (discussed in earlier sections)487 into its 
operational status quo.  Peer support programs, or “stress units,” can 
be especially helpful in fields prone to PTSD and where stressors are 
often shared.488  Stress units are group meetings led by peer mentors 
under mental health professional supervision where staff can discuss 
daily challenges or seek guidance for more serious incidents.489  These 
sessions can be more comfortable and successful than formal mental 
health services, which are often stigmatized.490  The DOC’s 
organizational culture should strive to be one that encourages 
dialogue, reflection, and sharing of both positive and negative 
experiences.  This will create a healthier jail system for all. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent announcement of the eventual closure of Rikers Island 
marked a watershed moment in corrections in New York City and on 
a national scale.491  There is an unprecedented amount of public and 
governmental support for eliminating Rikers—a penal colony plagued 
by a history of violence, abuse, and despair for the incarcerated 
population and DOC staff alike.492  But simply building new jails off 
the island will not automatically result in a reformed DOC.  Better 
outcomes for staff and incarcerated people in New York City requires 
a complete rethinking of the DOC’s organizational culture, including 
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clarifying how the DOC operates and behaves, its values, and what its 
ultimate goals are.493  Regardless of where the new facilities are 
located and how they are designed, the DOC must seize this historic 
opportunity to transform itself holistically. 
Much of the operational reforms over the last fifty years at the 
DOC have been the result of litigation and consent decrees.494  While 
litigation can have an impact on operations, particularly in developing 
minimum standards to govern department operations, it cannot force 
the holistic reforms necessary to make lasting change at the DOC.495 
After decades of litigation and corresponding consent decrees, the 
Nunez case and consent decree forced larger-scale reforms at the 
DOC.496  The Nunez monitoring team is working closely with the city 
and the DOC to develop and implement reforms across a host of core 
functions including hiring, training, and use of force.497  However, 
these reforms are being devised under the relatively narrow scope of 
the litigation rather than being contemplated as a sustainable reform 
strategy.498 
Comprehensive reform—the kind of reform that can stop endemic 
violence and truly change treatment and conditions in DOC 
facilities—involves more than just remaking the DOC’s physical 
space.  The DOC must, in many respects, start anew and rebuild itself 
by developing and carefully executing a strategic change management 
plan.499  Critical to this plan, and its ultimate success, will be the 
DOC’s deliberate analysis of its current organizational culture and 
the impact of that culture on daily operations.500 
In order for operational reforms to take hold in the long-term, 
organizational culture change must also be addressed.501  A proactive 
and supportive environment for staff and management will allow the 
operational reforms to be successful.  This Article has described the 
litigation and reform history at the DOC, the theory underlying 
culture change in correctional facilities, as well as certain critical areas 
of operational reform.502  The five areas of focus outlined in this 
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report—accountability in management and performance, procedures 
and policies, recruiting and hiring, training and education, and 
wellbeing and support—do not exhaustively cover the challenges 
facing the DOC.503  Rather, they are key areas to take into account 
when devising a strategic plan for the DOC’s organizational culture 
change. 
Unless the DOC reforms its organizational culture, the broader 
criminal justice reforms and the development of new jail facilities will 
bring the DOC only so far.  The abuse and troubling conditions of 
confinement will continue, simply moving off the island into the new 
facilities along with the staff and those who are detained. 
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